Shai Vardi

Proposes a simple and implementable modification of the current system that would greatly reduce incentives for tanking, a phenomenon in which teams attempt to purposefully lose games. Shows that it not only greatly reduces incentives to tank but also produces an order of the teams that is closer to the true ranking than the current system does.

Designs an algorithm for obtaining the optimal fairness as a function of the amount of reallocation allowed.

Presents an alternative to the current system where battleground states make millions of dollars each presidential campaign, while the safe states get virtually nothing. Offers neither party an advantage over the current system, and safe states also reap the benefits of presidential elections by becoming relevant to the candidates.

Defines a generalization of cut-and-choose protocols —forced-cut protocols— in which some cuts are made exogenously while others are made by the cutter, and show that there exist efficient non-exploitable forced-cut protocols.

Designs local computation mechanisms - ones that run extremely quickly even when the input is very large, for a variety of classical game-theoretical problems.