Michael J. Malbin

Analyzes New York's new public campaign finance program, demonstrating the program’s potential to transform the political landscape by enabling candidates to rely more on small-dollar contributions from constituents and less on big donors and special interests while still raising competitive sums.

Discusses the fragility of democratic institutions and proposes a "neo-Madisonian" approach to campaign finance. Emphasizes the importance of small-donor public financing to enhance representation while addressing the challenges posed by political polarization and the influence of large national parties.

Discusses the significant rise in independent expenditures (IEs) in U.S. elections over the past decade, demonstrating that the growth has been uneven across types of elections and spenders under different legal regimes. Findings highlight the importance of disaggregating spenders, elections, and laws in order to explain IEs more fully. 

Examines New York's new public campaign financing system for state elections. Argues that some of the plan’s innovative provisions are worth noticing nationally (particularly the provisions for legislative elections) while also noting that some essentially unrelated items on minor party ballot access threaten to pull the whole package down.

Includes chapters and tables on presidential elections, congressional elections, political parties, and independent expenditures.

Aims to be a handbook of consistent information available to guide them through what the precedents have been for money in federal elections.

Explores some of the likely interplay between political parties and non-party organizations after the Supreme Court's decision in McCutcheon v. Federal Election Commission. Argues that even though the holding in McCutcheon may have been about aggregate contribution limits, the reasoning directly challenges the rationale for base contribution limits.

Finds that New York City's campaign finance matching fund program increased the number, proportional role, and diversity of small donors in city council elections but that the Los Angeles program was substantially less effective. Concludes with a discussion of major arguments for and against increasing small donor participation as a goal for public policy.

Examines independent spending in state elections before and after the Supreme Court decision in Citizens United v. FEC.  Finds that the decision did not have much of a direct effect on business spending, despite public expectations.

Reviews Robert E. Mutch's Buying the Vote: A History of Campaign Finance Reform, Raymond J. La Raja & Brian F. Schaffner's Campaign Finance and Political Polarization: When Purists Prevail,  and Richard L. Hasen's Plutocrats United: Campaign Money, The Supreme Court, and the Distortion of American Elections.